Abstract: I review the literature on the economic impacts of climate change, an externality that is unprecedentedly large, complex, and uncertain. Only 14 estimates of the total damage cost of climate change have been published, a research effort that is in sharp contrast to the urgency of the public debate and the proposed expenditure on greenhouse gas emission reduction. These estimates show that climate change initially improves economic welfare. However, these benefits are sunk. Impacts would be predominantly negative later in the century. Global average impacts would be comparable to the welfare loss of a few percent of income, but substantially higher in poor countries. There are over 200 estimates of the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions. The uncertainty about the social cost of carbon is large and rightskewed. For a standard discount rate, the expected value $50/tC, which is much lower than the price of carbon in the European Union but much higher than the price of carbon elsewhere. Current estimates of the damage costs of climate change are incomplete, with positive and negative biases. Most important among the missing impacts are the indirect effects of climate change on economic development, large scale biodiversity loss, low probability -high impact scenarios, the impact of climate change on violent conflict, and the impacts of climate change beyond 2100. From a welfare perspective, the impact of climate change is problematic because population is endogenous, and because policy analyses should separate impatience, risk aversion, and inequity aversion between and within countries.
The Economic Impact of Climate Change
Introduction
Climate change is one of the defining issues of the early 21 st century. The research effort is enormous, and media attention is intense. Climate change is the mother of all externalities, larger, more complex, and more uncertain than any other environmental problem. Sulphur dioxide emissions, one of the main causes of acidification, arise from impurities in fossil fuels. Sulphur is a nuisance as well as an externality. However, thermal energy is generated by breaking the chemical bonds in carbohydrates (e.g., oil) and oxidising the components to CO 2 and H 2 O. That is, CO 2 is intrinsic to fossil fuel combustion. Similarly, methane (CH 4 ) emissions are necessary to prevent the build-up of hydrogen in anaerobic digestion. One cannot have beef, dairy, or rice without methane emissions. Greenhouse gas emissions are therefore fundamental to our food production and our energy system. There are no easy solutions.
The sources of greenhouse gas emissions are also more diffuse than that of any other environmental problem. Every company, every farm, every household emits some greenhouse gases. The impacts are similarly pervasive. Agriculture, energy use, health, and nature are directly affected by the weather, and this in turn affects everything and everyone. Indeed, it cannot be excluded that poor countries are poor partly because they are hot. The depletion of the ozone layer is another global externality, but its causes (substances used in a small number of industrial processes and residential applications) and consequences (human health, ecosystems) are rather confined. The causes and consequences of climate change are very diverse, and those who contribute least are most vulnerable. Climate change is therefore not just an efficiency problem, but also an equity problem. As the status quo is an unjust externality, the Coasian separation of equity and efficiency has little practical value. Climate change is also a long-term problem. Some greenhouse gases have an atmospheric life-time of tens of thousands of years, and a small part of carbon dioxide will stay in the atmosphere practically forever. Greenhouse gas emissions are in this sense comparable to nuclear waste, but the quantities are too large to permit the containment approach that is used to store radioactive material. Finally, the uncertainties about climate change are vast -indeed so vast that the standard tools of decision-making under uncertainty and learning may not be applicable. As all these issues come together in the emission of greenhouse gases, climate change truly is one of the greatest intellectual challenges of our times.
Therefore this paper cannot possibly cover all economic aspects of climate change. I focus on the impacts of climate change, and sketch the implications for policy. Section 2 reviews the estimates of the total economic impacts. Section 3 surveys the marginal cost estimates. Section 4 discusses the many and large research gaps. Section 5 concludes.
Estimates of the total impact of climate change
The first studies of the welfare impacts of climate change were done for the USA (Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1991; Titus, 1992; cf. Smith, 1996) . Although Nordhaus (1991; cf. Ayres and Walter, 1991) extrapolated his US estimate to the world, and Hohmeyer and Gaertner (1992) published some estimates, the credit for the first serious study of the global welfare impacts goes to Fankhauser (1994 Fankhauser ( , 1995 . Other global estimates were published by Nordhaus (1994a ,b), Tol (1995 , Nordhaus and Yang (1996) , Plambeck and Hope (1996) , Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) , Mendelsohn et al. (2000a ,b), Tol (2002a , Maddison (2003) , Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) and Nordhaus (2006) .
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There are a dozen studies. The number of authors is lower, and can be grouped into a UCL group and a Yale one. 2 Most fields are dominated by a few people and fewer schools, but dominance in this field is for want of challengers. The impact of this is unknown, but this insider argues below that the field suffers from tunnel-vision. This situation is worrying. Politicians proclaim that climate change is the greatest challenge of this century. Billions of dollars have been spent on studying the problem and its solutions, and hundreds of billions may be spent on emission reduction (e.g., Weyant et al., 2006 ). Yet, the economics profession has essentially closed its eyes to the question whether this expenditure is justified.
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The reasons for the dearth of research are:
• lack of funding -this work is too applied for funding by academic sources, while applied agencies dislike the typical results and pre-empt embarrassment by not funding economic impact estimates;
• lack of daring -this research requires making many, often questionable assumptions, and taking on well-entrenched incumbents; and
• lack of reward -the economics profession frowns on applied research in general and interdisciplinarity in particular.
In addition, many people, including many economists, would argue that climate change is beyond cost-benefit analysis (e.g., van den Bergh, 2004) and that monetary valuation is unethical (e.g., Spash, 2007; Ackerman, 2008) . 1 The numbers used by Hope (2006) are averages of previous estimates by Fankhauser and Tol; Stern et al. (2006) adopt the work of Hope (2006) . 2 Nordhaus and Mendelsohn are colleagues and collaborators; Fankhauser, Maddison and Tol all worked with David Pearce and one another; Rehdanz was a student of Maddison and Tol. 3 There is a large literature on the economics of climate change, but it is focussed on international agreements, policy instruments for emission reduction, and impacts of emission reduction. Table 1 shows selected characteristics of the published estimates. Figure 1 displays these estimates against the global mean temperature. A few insights emerge. First, the welfare impact of a doubling of the atmospheric concentration on the current economy is relatively small. Although the estimates differ, welfare losses are a few percent of GDP or less. It is therefore no surprise that cost-benefit analyses of climate change recommend only limited greenhouse gas emission reduction -for instance, Nordhaus (1993) argues that the optimal rate of emission reduction is 10-15%. 4 Second, although the impact is relatively small, is not negligible. A damage of a few per cent of GDP per year is a real concern.
Third, some estimates (Hope, 2006; Mendelsohn et al., 2000a,b; Tol, 2002b) point to initial benefits of climate change. 5 This is more clearly seen in Figure 1 . The initial benefits are partly because more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere reduces water stress in plants and may make them grow faster (Long et al., 2006) . Another reason is that the global economy is concentrated in the temperate zone, where warming reduces heating costs and cold-related health problems. At the same time, the world population is concentrated in the tropics, where the impacts of initial climate change are probably negative.
Even if, initially, economic impacts may well be positive, it does not follow that greenhouse gas emissions should be subsidized as the climate responds rather slowly to changes in emissions. The initial impacts cannot be avoided; they are sunk benefits.
Impacts start falling at roughly the same time emission control affects climate change (Hitz and Smith, 2004; Tol, 2002b; Tol et al., 2000) . The fitted line in Figure 1 suggests that the turning point is at 1.1ºC warming, with a standard deviation of 0.6 ºC. Even though total impacts of 1-2ºC warming may be positive compared to today, incremental impacts are negative.
The fourth insight is that relative impacts are higher in poorer countries (see also Yohe and Schlesinger, 2002) . 6 This is because poorer countries are less able to adapt to climate change (Adger, 2006; Alberini et al., 2006; Smit and Wandel, 2006; Yohe and Tol, 2002) , particularly in health (Tol, 2005) . Poor countries are more exposed to climate change, particularly in agriculture and water resources. Furthermore, poorer countries tend be hotter and therefore closer to biophysical temperature limits and short on spatial analogues should it get warmer still. However, there are fewer studies on the impacts of climate change on developing countries than on developed countries. 7 This has two policy implications. Firstly, greenhouse gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere. It does not matter where they are emitted or by whom, the effect on climate change is the same.
Therefore, any justification of stringent emission abatement is an appeal to consider the plight of the poor and the impacts imposed on them by the rich (Schelling, 2000) .
Secondly, if poverty is the root cause for vulnerability to climate change, one may wonder whether stimulating economic growth or emission abatement is the better way to reduce impacts. Indeed, Tol and Dowlatabadi (2001) and Tol and Yohe (2006) argue that the economic growth foregone by stringent abatement more than offsets the avoided impacts of climate change, at least for malaria, while Tol (2005) shows that development is a cheaper way of reducing climate-change-induced malaria than is emission reduction.
Moreover, richer countries may find it easier and cheaper to compensate poorer countries for the climate change damages caused, than to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such compensation may be explicit, but would more likely take the shape of technical and financial assistance with adaptation (cf. Paavola and Adger, 2006 Forecasts are imperfect, agents are constrained in many ways, and markets are often distorted -particularly in the areas that matter most for the impacts of climate change, viz. water, food, energy, and health. Therefore, recent studies may be too optimistic on adaptation and thus on the impacts of climate change. The observed trend cannot be extrapolated.
The broad agreement between the studies in Table 1 is remarkable as they used different methods. The studies by Fankhauser, Nordhaus (1994) , and Tol use the enumerative method. That is, 'physical' impact estimates are obtained one by one, from 'natural science' papers based on 'process-based' models or 'laboratory experiments'. Physical impacts are multiplied with their respective prices, and added up. The 'prices' are obtained by benefit transfer (see below). In contrast, Mendelsohn's work is based on direct estimates of the welfare impacts, using observed variations (across space) in prices and expenditures to discern the effect of climate. Mendelsohn estimates are done per sector and then added up, but physical modelling and benefit transfer are avoided.
Nordhaus (2006) The enumerative studies rely on controlled experiments (albeit with detailed, processbased models in most cases). This has the advantages of ease of interpretation and physical realism, but the main disadvantage is that certain things are kept constant that would change in reality. Adaptation is probably the key element. The statistical studies rely on uncontrolled experiments. This has the advantage that everything varies as it does in reality, but the disadvantages are that the assessment is constrained by observed variations 8 and that effects may be spuriously attributed to climate. The broad agreement of the estimates from such different methods enhances confidence.
The shortcomings of the estimates in Table 1 are interesting too. Welfare losses are approximated with direct costs, ignoring general equilibrium and even partial equilibrium effects (see below). In the enumerative studies, impacts are assessed independently of one another, even if there is an obvious overlap as between water resources and agriculture.
Estimates are often based on extrapolation from a few detailed case studies, and extrapolation is to climate and levels of development that are very different from the original case study. Little effort has been put into validating the underlying models against independent data -even though the findings of the first empirical estimate of the impact of climate change on agriculture (Mendelsohn et al., 1994) were in stark contrast to earlier results (e.g., Parry, 1990) . Valuation is based on benefit transfer, driven only by difference in per capita income. Realistic modelling of adaptation is problematic, and studies either assume no adaptation or perfect adaptation. Many impacts are unquantified, and some of these may be large (see below). The uncertainties are unknown -only 5 of the 14 estimates in Table 1 have some estimate of uncertainty. These problems are gradually solved, but progress is slow. Indeed, the above list of caveats is similar to those in Tol (1996, 1997) .
The enumerative method for estimating total impacts uses the inner product of a vector of quantities and prices. For traded goods and services, market prices are used. For nontraded goods and services, other methods are needed. As primary valuation studies are expensive, time-consuming, and situation-specific, monetisation of climate change impacts relies on benefit transfer. That is, values estimated for other issues are applied to climate change concerns. Furthermore, values estimated for a limited number of locations are extrapolated to the world, and values estimated for a given period are extrapolated to the future. This is unavoidable. However, tests of benefit transfer methods have shown time and again that extrapolation errors are substantial (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999) .
There is also a conceptual issue with valuation. Empirical studies have shown that values can differ up to an order of magnitude depending on whether one estimates the willingness to pay (WTP) for improved environmental services, or whether one estimates the willingness to accept compensation (WTAC) for diminished services. There is a substantial literature on this matter (cf. Horowitz and McConnell, 2002) , and it is now clear that this is more than a measurement error. People seem to be averse to risks imposed on them by others, and this would drive a wedge between WTP and WTAC. The impact studies listed in Table 1 all use WTP as the basis for valuation, as recommended by Arrow et al. (1993) . Implicitly, the policy problem is phrased as "how much are we willing to pay to buy a better climate for our children?" Alternatively, the policy problem could be phrased as "how much compensation should we pay our children for deteriorating their climate?" Because of the deviation between WTP and WTAC, these two questions have different answers. Reducing emissions is more practical than setting up an intergenerational compensation fund, and this argues for WTP. However, the WTP formulation takes "no emission reduction" as the default, while the WTAC formulation takes "no climate change" as the default -WTP thus violates the "do no harm" principle that is paramount in ethics and law (Tol and Verheyen, 2004) . Table 1 and Figure 1 make clear that the uncertainty about the impact of climate change is vast -just how vast will become clear when the marginal impacts are discussed below.
The studies that are based on a benchmark warming of 2.5ºC have an average impact of -0.7% of GDP, and a standard deviation of 1.2% of GDP -note that this is the uncertainty about the best estimate of the impacts, rather than the uncertainty about the impacts. Only 5 of the 14 studies in Table 1 report some measure of uncertainty. Two of these report a standard deviation, suggesting symmetry in the distribution. Three studies report a confidence interval -of these, two studies find the uncertainty is right-skewed, but one study finds a left-skewed distribution. Although there is little and contradictory evidence, negative surprises should be more likely than positive surprises. While it is relatively easy to imagine a disaster scenario -involving massive sea level rise, mass migration and violent conflict -it is not at all easy to argue that climate change will be a huge boost to economic growth. Even though there are no reliable estimates of the uncertainty, it should be large and right-skewed. The policy implication is that emission reduction should err on the ambitious side.
Estimates of the marginal damage cost of greenhouse gas emissions
Although the number of studies of the total costs of climate change is small (Table 1 has 13 studies and 14 estimates), a larger number of studies estimate the marginal costs: Tol (2008) reports 47 studies with 211 estimates, and a few more have been published since (Hope, 2008a,b; Nordhaus, 2008; Stern and Taylor, 2007) . The marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide, also known as the social cost of carbon, is defined as the net present value of the incremental damage due to an infinitesimally small increase in carbon dioxide emissions. The marginal damage cost equals the Pigou tax if it is computed along the optimal trajectory of emissions. Marginal damage cost estimates thus derive from total cost estimates. Note that some of the total cost estimates (Maddison, 2003; Mendelsohn et al., 2000a,b; Nordhaus, 2006; Rehdanz and Maddison, 2005 ) have yet to be used for marginal cost estimation. Therefore, the 211 estimates of the social cost of carbon are based on 9 estimates of the total impact of climate change. The empirical basis for the optimal carbon tax is much smaller than is suggested by the number of estimates.
There is only one way to take a first derivative, so how can it be that 9 totals yield 211 Tol, 2003; Weitzman, forthcoming) . The joint probability density function follows from addition, using weights that reflect the age and quality of the study as well as the importance that the authors attach to the estimate -some estimates are presented as central estimates, others as sensitivity analyses or upper and lower bounds. However, as is shown by the estimates for three subsamples of the data using the same pure rate of time preference, time discounting is only part of the uncertainty. For a 3% pure rate of time preference, the mean social cost of carbon is $50/tC, and the median is $37/tC. However, the 99%ile is $271/tC. That is, the uncertainty is large and rightskewed. For a 1% pure rate of time preference, these numbers are more than twice as high. If the pure rate of time preference is lowered further, to 0%, estimates increase further -but by less than one might have expected, because most estimates are (inappropriately) based on a finite time horizon. 9 Table 2 shows that the estimates for the whole sample are dominated by the estimates based on lower discount rates. Note that there is one estimate (Hohmeyer and Gartner, 1992 ) based on a zero consumption discount rate (cf. Davidson, 2006 ) and thus a negative pure rate of time preference.
To place these numbers in their context, new power plants would be carbon-free for a carbon tax of $50-100/tC (Weyant et al., 2006) while transport would decarbonise only at a much higher carbon tax Jacoby, 2005, 2006) . Substantial emission reduction requires a carbon tax of at least $50/tC, and can barely be justified with a pure rate of time preference of 3%. Note that the social cost of carbon is a global estimatethe contribution of each country to the damages is smaller.
Research needs

Higher order impacts
The literature reviewed above is largely limited to estimates of the direct costs, that is price times quantity, with constant prices. This is a crude approximation of the welfare impact. General equilibrium studies of the effect of climate change on agriculture have a long history (Kane et al., 1992; Darwin, 2004) . These papers show that markets matter, and may even reverse the sign of the initial impact estimate (Yates and Strzepek, 1998) . Bosello et al. (2007) and Darwin and Tol (2001) show that sea level rise would change production and consumption in countries that are not directly affected. Ignoring the general equilibrium effects leads to small negative bias in the global welfare loss, but differences in regional welfare losses are much greater and may be negative as well as positive. Similarly, Bosello et al. (2006) show that the direct costs are biased towards zero for health, while Berrittella et al. (2006) emphasize the redistribution of impacts on tourism through markets. More research alone these lines is needed.
A cross-sectional analysis of per capita income and temperature may suggest that people are poor because of the climate (Nordhaus, 2006; van Kooten, 2004 Demo-economic models (Galor and Weil, 1999 ) also put mortality 10 centre stage. In their models, the difference between Malthusian stagnation and exponential growth is determined by the quality-quantity trade-off for children, which is partly driven by infant mortality. A risk-averse parent would opt for more children, so as to increase the chance of old-age care; a large number of inadvertently surviving children would reduce the money spent on their education. These children would become poor adults, unable to afford health care for their offspring. Should climate change increase the prevalence of malaria and diarrhoea, then the poverty trap would widen. This mechanism has not been studied for climate change, but the impact of climate change on economic growth may dominate the static impacts shown in Table 1 .
Missing impacts
The impacts of climate change that have been quantified and monetised include the impacts on agriculture and forestry, water resources, coastal zones, energy consumption, air quality, and human health. Obviously, this list is incomplete. Also within each impact 10 albeit of infants, not of grown settlers from distant places category, the assessment is incomplete. Studies of the impacts of sea level rise on coastal zones, for instance, typically omit saltwater intrusion in groundwater (Nicholls and Tol, 2006) . Furthermore, studies typically compare the situations before and after climate change, but ignore that there will be substantial period during which adaptation is suboptimal -the costs of this are not know.
Some of the missing impacts are most likely negative. Increasing water temperatures would increase the costs of cooling power plants (Szolnoky et al., 1997) . Redesigning urban water management systems, be it for more of less water, would be costly (Ashley et al., 2005) , as would implementing the safeguards against the increased uncertainty about future circumstances. This is true for other infrastructure as well. Extratropical storms may increase, leading to greater damage and higher building standards (Dorland et al., 1999) . Tropical storms do more damage, but it is not known how climate change would alter the frequency, intensity, and spread of tropical storms (McDonald et al., 2005) .
Ocean acidification may well harm fisheries (Kikkawa et al., 2004) . These matters are relatively small compared to overall economic activity. Even if climate change would double or triple the cost, the impact would be small.
Other missing impacts are probably positive. Higher wind speeds in the mid-latitudes would decrease the costs of wind and wave energy (Breslow and Sailor, 2002) . Less sea ice would improve the accessibility of arctic harbours, would reduce the costs of exploitation of oil and minerals in the Arctic, and may even open up new transport routes between Europe and East Asia (Wilson et al., 2004) . Warmer weather would reduce expenditures on clothing and food, and traffic disruptions due to snow and ice (Carmicheal et al., 2004) . Also in these cases, the impact of climate change is likely to be small relative to the economy.
Some missing impacts are mixed. Tourism is an example. Climate change may well drive summer tourists towards the poles and up the mountains, which amounts to a redistribution of tourist revenue (Berrittella et al., 2006) . Other impacts are simply not known. Some rivers may see an increase in flooding, and others a decrease (Kundzewicz et al., 2005) .
These are the small unknowns. There may also be big unknowns: biodiversity loss, extreme climate scenarios, violent conflict, and the very long term. The impact of climate change on economic development, discussed above, may also be included among the "big unknowns".
Climate change would have a profound impact on nature. Plants and animals are directly affected temperature and precipitation, and indirectly through interactions with other organisms. Climate change implies changes in distribution and abundance, invasions, and local and global extinctions (Gitay et al., 2001) . Economists have problems with this.
First, there are few quantitative studies of the impacts of climate change on ecosystems and biodiversity because quantitative ecology is still in its infancy, and there are many species to be modelled. Second, changes in land use and nutrient cycles, alien invasions and acidification also have large-scale and profound effects on nature. This hampers interpretation of past observations, complicates projections of the future, and muddles the attribution of impacts to causes (Parmesan and Yohe, 2003) . Third, valuation of ecosystem change is difficult. Over the years, methods and applications have grown more specific (e.g., Champ et al., 2003) while benefit transfer remains difficult (Brouwer and Spaninks, 1999) . Wide-spread change that is hard to detect and to attribute is beyond current valuation methods. Nevertheless, valuation studies have consistently shown that, although people are willing to pay something to preserve or improve nature, they are not prepared to pay a large amount. Most studies put the total willingness to pay for nature conservation at substantially less than 1% of income (Pearce and Moran, 1994) . Even if climate-change-induced biodiversity loss would be worth as much as 1% of GDP, this would not fundamentally change the total impact estimates of climate change.
Extreme climate scenarios are another big unknown. Examples are a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation (e.g., Marotzke, 2000) , a collapse of the West-Antarctic Ice Sheet (Vaughan and Spouge, 2002) , and massive releases of methane from the permafrost (e.g., Harvey and Huang, 1995) . These scenarios have a number of things in common.
First, they would lead to rapid changes in the natural system. Second, impacts have hardly been studied. Third, the mechanism is only partially understood. Fourth, the probability is unknown but probably low. Rapid climate change would be a problem, as there would be little time to adapt. This suggests that impacts would be large. Impact models, however, have been designed for more gradual climate change. Nicholls et al.
(forthcoming) find that the impacts of sea level rise sharply increase should the WestAntarctic Ice Sheet collapse, but they may have overestimated adaptation and hence underestimated impacts (Olsthoorn et al., forthcoming) . Link and Tol (2004) estimate the impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation which slows global warming, at least over land. Unsurprisingly, they report benefits of a THC shutdown.
Research into the determinants of violent conflict has concluded that resource scarcity is at best a contributing factor to, but never a cause of war (Alesina and Spolaore, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1994 ). The corollary is that climate-changeinduced resource scarcity would not lead to war either, although it may intensify preexisting conflicts. It is therefore impossible to estimate the impact of climate change on violent conflict without a scenario with background conflicts. Such scenarios do not exist; all future scenarios for climate change are nice and peaceful (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2001 ). Clearly, an intensification of conflict would be something to worry about. Butkiewicz and Hanakkaya (2005) find that political instability (i.e., the chance of war) may decrease per capita economic growth in the poorest countries by 2% per yearalthough actual war has no significant effect. Conflict may thus dominate climate change impacts, but, as said, it is not clear whether climate change would lead to conflict.
The fourth big unknown is the impact in the very long term. Most static impact analyses are for 2xCO 2 only, while most dynamic impact studies stop at 2100. Climate change will not stop there, but most estimates for 2100 suggest that climate change has a negative impact, that the impact is growing, and that the growth rate is accelerating -see Figure 1 .
Obviously, what happens after 2100 is important for climate policy, but we have not even started to study this -this is true for emissions, for climate change, for impacts, and for the monetary value of those impacts.
Welfare
The information gaps described above require research that combines economics with other disciplines. There are two issues that are pure economics. Both have to do with the specification of the welfare function.
The impacts of climate change are uncertain, but will likely fall heaviest on poorer countries (cf. Saelen et al., 2008) . The reason for this is simple. It is well known that consumption smoothing over time and risk aversion are different things, and different again from inequity aversion -and that attitudes towards income gaps are different within and between jurisdictions (e.g., Amiel et al., 1999) . Despite considerable research, welfare theorists have yet to find welfare and utility functions that make the necessary distinctions and can be used in applied work. Climate change adds urgency to solving the theoretical problems.
There is a similar problem with population. Standard welfare functions work fine if population growth is exogenous, but produce peculiar and undesirable results if population is endogenous (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1984) . As climate change affects mortality and migration, population is endogenous to climate policy. A standard welfare function such as W = Pln(C/P), with W welfare, P population and C total consumption, would put a premium on migration from poor to rich countries and would thus encourage sea level rise and discourage coastal protection. As above, this problem is well recognised in welfare theory, but a practical solution has yet to be found.
Discussion and conclusion
Research into the economic impacts of climate change began in earnest with the publication of Nordhaus (1991) . The tone of the survey of Pearce et al. (1995) suggest that the authors (including the present one) thought that everything was roughly known, and that research would be complete within a few years. This view was entirely mistaken.
After 17 years of research, I am reasonably confident that we know the scope of the research agenda. As argued above, there are a number of impacts for which we have reasonable estimates, and a number of impacts for which we know the order of magnitude. We also have a clear idea of the sensitivities of these estimates to particular assumptions, even though in some cases we do not really know what to assume. There are also a number of issues for which we are aware of our ignorance. I believe that the result of 17 years of research is that there are no more unknown unknowns, at least no sizeable ones.
This is a sobering conclusion, and I would not be the first expert to suffer from overconfidence (Morgan and Henrion, 1990) . It is worrying conclusion if one considers the amounts of money politicians are proposing to spend on greenhouse gas emission reduction. At present, we do not know whether this investment is too much or too little.
The number of published studies fit on a single page (see Table 1 ), and none of the researchers listed work full-time on this issue. This level of research effort is incommensurate with the perceived size of the climate problem, the expected costs of the solution, and the size of the research gaps.
Nonetheless, decisions should be made with the best available knowledge -even if the best available knowledge is not very good. The main advice to policy is given in Table 2 .
A government that plays a cooperative game on climate policy, and uses the same discount rate for climate change as for other decisions, should levy a carbon tax of $26/tC (mode) to $50/tC (mean). A higher tax can be justified by an appeal to risk (Weitzman, forthcoming), but not necessarily by an appeal for a lower discount rate (Nordhaus, 2008, Ch 9) or international equity (Schelling, 2000) . 
